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meaning (Percus 2006, Sauerland 2008). We present data from a picture selection task and a visual world
eye-tracking study on the English indefinite/definite determiner. Based on the findings we argue that 1)
the epistemic status of anti-uniqueness inferences is much weaker than the uniqueness presupposition
of the definite or implicature raised by the indefinite, and 2) drawing these inferences requires more effort
than not drawing it or calculating presuppositions or implicatures.
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An experimental Investigation of Antipresuppositions
Nadine Bade and Florian Schwarz
1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to assess whether inferences resulting from violating the principle Maximize
Presupposition behave differently from presuppositions and implicatures in processing, thus testing
predictions of theories which separate those inferences out from these more well-studied aspects of
meaning (Percus 2006, Sauerland 2008). We present data from a picture selection task and a visual
world eye-tracking study on the English indefinite/definite determiner. Based on the findings we
argue that 1) the epistemic status of anti-uniqueness inferences is much weaker than the uniqueness
presupposition of the definite or implicature raised by the indefinite, and 2) drawing these inferences
requires more effort than not drawing it or calculating presuppositions or implicatures.

2 Theoretical Background
Presupposition triggers are obligatory when their presupposition is fulfilled in the context, see (1).
(1) a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

John came to the party. Bill came, # (too).
Jenna went ice skating yesterday. She went # (again) today.
John knows / # believes Paris is in France.
The/ # A sun is shining.
The father/ # The fathers of the victim arrived at the crime scene.

A subset of these data, including the competition between definite and indefinite determiner in (1d),
can be accounted for by assuming a principle Maximize Presupposition (Heim 1991). This is a
general pragmatic principle accounting for the insertion of presupposition triggers, see below.
Maximize Presupposition (MP! ) (Heim 1991) Make your contribution presuppose as much as
possible!
More sophisticated versions of Maximize Presupposition assume that certain items are ordered
on a scale of presuppositional strength (Percus 2006, Sauerland 2008, Chemla 2008), see (2).1
(2) {the, a} , {know, believe} , {too, ∅}, {again, ∅} , {both, all}
The oddness of (3a) under a MP! approach is the result of pragmatic reasoning: since there
is a presuppositionally stronger competitor, (3b), the hearer assumes, upon hearing (3a), that the
presupposition of this stronger alternative is false. The result is an inference that it is not certain that
there is exactly one father of the victim. This inference goes against common knowledge and thus
makes the sentence odd.
(3) a. #A father of the victim arrived at the crime scene.
b. The father of the victim arrived at the crime scene.
Whereas the mechanism for deriving the inference is the same as the one for the derivation of
implicatures MP! cannot be subsumed under the maxim of quantity. This is due to the observation
that the two sentences in (3a) are identical on the level of assertion.2 As a result neither one of the
1 There is disagreement, however, which items are parts of lexical scales and thus subject to this ordering.
According to Sauerland (2008) only items with well defined lexical alternatives are managed by MP! , see Bade
(2016) for discussion of the potentially limited empirical scope of MP!
2 Of course, one need not assume that. If competition is on the level of assertion, however, the inferences at
hand are considered implicatures, which is not consistent with their different behaviour.
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two is more informative than the other. This is a welcome result since MP! based inferences differ
from implicatures and presuppositions in important respects.
First, inferences based on MP! project since the competition with the presuppositional item is
unaffected by operators such as negation, questions and conditionals, see (4).
(4) a. #A father/fathers of the victim did not arrive at the crime scene.
b. #If a father/fathers of the victim arrived at the crime scene...
c. #Did a father/fathers of the victim arrive at the crime scene?
This is predicted as the presupposition of the competitor projects through all these operators. Furthermore, items which are already the strongest item on a Horn-scale seem to enter competition with
presuppositionally stronger items, see the oddness of the sentences in (4).
(5) a. #Not all arms of John are broken.
b. #If all arms of John are broken...
c. #Are all arms of John broken?
If one assumes “both” to be a competitor for the universal quantifier on the level of presuppositions, the oddness of these sentences can be explained parallel to the case of “the” above. Second,
MP! based inferences are epistemically weaker than presuppositions, and implicatures (Heim 1991,
Sauerland 2008), consider (6a) as opposed to (6b).
(6) a. Robert caught a 6ft long catfish.
b. Robert caught the 6ft long catfish.
Whereas the speaker must be certain that there is a unique 6ft long catfish to utter (6b) s/he does not
have to be certain that there is more than one when uttering (6a). (6a) only warrants the inference
that the speaker is not certain that there is a unique 6ft long catfish, without strengthening to the
speaker being certain that there not a unique 6ft long catfish.
Given these theoretical assumptions inferences arising as a result of a violation of MP! have
a special status, which differs both from presuppositions and implicatures. They are weak inferences, which resist strengthening, and project. As a result, MP! based inferences should also show
a processing pattern which is different from those usually associated with implicatures and presuppositions. Before spelling out more detailed predictions, we lay out the general approach of our
study.

3 Experimental Evidence
3.1 Idea and Method
The aim of the study was to gain insights into the interpretation of indefinite sentences like (7a)
with definite ones like (7b) in contexts where they enter a competition based on MP! . Specifically,
we were interested in the derivation of different inferences associated with these sentences and the
time course of their processing. (7a) has both an implicature that there is exactly one gray cat on
the third floor and an MP! based inference (usually referred to as the “antiuniqueness” inference or
“antipresupposition” of the indefinite) that there is more than one cat on the third floor in the given
context. (7b) in turn has the presupposition that there is exactly one cat on the third floor.
(7) a. A cat on the third floor is gray.
There is more than one cat on the third floor.
There is exactly one gray cat on the third floor.
b. The cat on the third floor is gray.
There is exactly one cat on the third floor.
The method we chose to test the availability of these inferences and how fast they can be accessed was a visual-world eye-tracking experiment using auditory stimuli.
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3.2 Material and Design

We had a toal of four conditions, one with the indefinite and definite determiners respectively, and
one with a numeral, which was either focused or not, see examples in (8).
(8) a.
b.
c.
d.

A shirt in Benjamin’s closet is blue.
The shirt in Benjamin’s closet is blue.
One shirt in Benjamin’s closet is blue.
ONE shirt in Benjamin’s closet is blue.

INDEFINITE
DEFINITE
NUMERAL
NUMERAL F

For the three picture conditions two of three different pictures types were paired with each other and
presented with a third distractor picture. The picture types had different properties, specified below.
The pictures were always depicting kids with their containers containing different colored items.
Picture type 1 S AME C OLOR contained three of the relevant items, all of which had the color
given in the sentence, see example in Figure 1. The antiuniqueness inference of the indefinite is
verified in this case, however implicature of the indefinite and presupposition of the definite are
falsified. The second picture type S INGLE I TEM contained one item of the relevant sort which had
the color described. This picture makes the presupposition of the definite true. Accordingly, the
antiuniqueness inference of the indefinite is falsified, the implicature is true as well, see an example
in Figure 2. The third picture type D IFF C OLOR contained three items of the relevant kind, only one
of which had the described color. This makes this picture the perfect competitor for the sentence
with the indefinite according to theoretical assumptions. This is because both the antiuniqueness
inference as well as the implicature of the indefinite are true in this picture. The presupposition of
the definite is false, see example in Figure 3 below. The properties of the pictures are summarized
in Table 1.

Figure 1: S AME C OLOR

Figure 2: S INGLE I TEM

Inference
Anti-PSP
PSP
Implicature

S AME C OLOR
TRUE
FALSE
FALSE

S INGLE I TEM
FALSE
TRUE
TRUE

Figure 3: D IFF C OLOR

D IFF C OLOR
TRUE
FALSE
TRUE

Table 1: Summary of picture properties.

There were three different picture conditions pairing two of the three picture types with a fourth
distractor type containing no relevant items, see picture conditions in (9) and in figures 4 to 6.
(9) Conditions A - C
a. A: type 1, type 2, type 4
b. B: type 2, type 3, type 4
c. C: type 1, type 3, type 4
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Figure 4: Condition A.

Figure 5: Condition B.

Figure 6: Condition C.
The four level factor DETERMINER was crossed with the three level factor PICTURE, resulting in
a 4x3 design and 12 experimental conditions in total. DETERMINER was treated as a between-group
factor, i.e. each participant only heard one determiner type. The conditions were distributed over
12 lists in a Latin square design. We had 18 critical items and 30 filler items, which were designed
to counterbalance the picture choices for the critical items. Specifically, we included fillers like in
(10a) to force the choice of S AME C OLOR pictures, and fillers like in (10b) and (10c) to force choices
of the distractor picture.
(10) a. There are three blue shirts in Benjamin’s closet.
b. There are no shirts in Benjamin’s closet.
c. There are only red balls in Benjamin’s closet.
Based on our theoretical assumptions we labeled the picture types given in Table 2 target choices
for indefinite and definite, respectively.
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A
B
C

definite
S INGLE I TEM
S INGLE I TEM
D IFF C OLOR
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indefinite
S AME C OLOR
D IFF C OLOR
D IFF C OLOR

Table 2: Target choices.
The 18 critical item were recorded in all 4 determiner conditions. They were cut using the
software P RAAT so that only the determiner changed and the rest of the sentence remained the same
across determiner conditions. Half of the time the recordings of the indefinite sentences were chosen
as the basis for cutting, the other half the sentences with the definite were used. This was done to
minimize differences in intonation between conditions so that we could make sure that only the
determiner played a role for the picture chosen.
3.3 Procedure and Participants
120 students of the University of Pennsylvania participated in the experiment. They were recruited
through the SONA system and received course credit for their participation. After consenting to
participate they read instructions on a computer screen. They went through two practice trials to get
familiar with the task. They heard a sentence and saw three different pictures on screen at the same
time. They were instructed to choose the picture they heard described by clicking on it. While doing
the task their eye movements were recorded using an EyeLink 1000 by SR Research. 18 trials that
exhibited more than 30% track-loss in the time window from the noun to the adjective were removed
for purposes of analysis.
3.4 Predictions
We will now turn to the predictions for the different picture conditions. For reasons of simplicity,
we will lay out predictions for the definite and indefinite and will not discuss numerals and focused numerals separately. We assume the basic pattern to be the same for simple indefinites and
numerals.3
Picture condition A contained the two critical picture types S AME C OLOR and S INGLE I TEM,
see figures 7a and 7b below.
(11) {A /The /One /ONE} shirt in Benjamin’s closet is blue.

(a) Type 1 S AME C OLOR

(b) Type 2 S INGLE I TEM

Figure 7: Condition A.
We predict type S INGLE I TEM do be chosen for the definite due to its presupposition, whereas
3 One reason to include numerals was to be able to compare the results to German data, where indefinite and
numeral have the same form. We wanted to make sure that German “ein” behaves like a proper indefinite in
the relevant aspects. We expected the difference between “one”, which can be focused, and “a” to mainly play
a role for implicature computation, since focus placement is predicted to change the rate of implicatures. Since
this is not the main issue of the present discussion, we will not discuss numerals in any detail here.
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type S AME C OLOR should be chosen for the indefinite due to its anti-presupposition. In addition, the
target choice should be quicker for the definite than for the indefinite, given previous evidence that
presuppositions are available immediately, whereas anti-presuppositions are the result of complex
reasoning based on the presupposition of the competitor.
Picture condition B contained picture types S INGLE I TEM and D IFF C OLOR, see Fig. 8a and 8b
below.
(12) {A /The /One /ONE} shirt in Benjamin’s closet is blue.

(a) Type 2 S INGLE I TEM

(b) Type 3 D IFF C OLOR

Figure 8: Condition B.
Again, S INGLE I TEM should be chosen for the definite condition. D IFF C OLOR is predicted to
be the target choice for the indefinite. Not only its implicature but also its antiuniqueness antipresupposition are verified. Identifying and picking the target should be quicker for the definite than
for the indefinite, for the same reasons specified above.
The third picture condition contained S AME C OLOR and D IFF C OLOR, see 9a and 9b below.

(a) Type 1 S AME C OLOR

(b) Type 3 D IFF C OLOR

Figure 9: Condition C.
There is no picture verifying the uniqueness presupposition of the definite in condition C. However, based on previous findings (Schwarz 2013) we assume that due to the possibility of restricting
the domain for the definite, which is easier in the D IFF C OLOR picture, D IFF C OLOR would be the target choice for the definite. The same should be true for the indefinite, given that anti-presupposition
and implicature are verified. Possibly, the target choices are equally slow for definite and indefinite in this condition, given the additional effort for computing inferences in the indefinite case and
finding the appropriate domain restriction for the definite case.
3.5 Results
We will first report the rates of target choices we found for each condition and determiner. The
predictions for condition A are borne out for the definite. The vast majority of the time participants
chose the S INGLE I TEM picture for the definite since it verifies the presupposition. Surprisingly, the
same pattern arose for the indefinite, suggesting that the anti-uniqueness inference did not play a role
at all in picture choices. The false implicature seems to keep participants from being able to choose
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the S AME C OLOR picture. This is also in line with the target choices being quick, as implicatures
should be processed early and immediately influence choice of picture (Huang and Snedeker 2009).
determiner
the
A
one
ONE

S AME C OLOR
6%
2%
5%
3%

S INGLE I TEM
94%
98%
95%
97%

RT
3230
3180
3288
3290

Table 3: Picture choices by determiner condition A.
The predictions were also borne out for the definite in condition B. S INGLE I TEM picture was
chose almost all of the time, as it verifies the presupposition. Contrary to our predictions, however,
D IFF C OLOR was not the picture most often chosen for sentences with the indefinite. While significantly more frequent than for definites (β = −0.43, SE = 0.13, z = 3.35, p < .001),4 D IFF C OLOR
choices were merely at 23%. They were significantly more frequent yet for numerals (for one:
β = 0.32, SE = 0.14, z = 2.34, p < .05), but even so remain only at about chance level. Again, antiuniqueness does not seem to be a strong factor for picture choice. However, two things are noteworthy: first, target choices for the indefinite are significantly slower than for the definite (β = −879.6,
SE = 355.1, t = −2.48) suggesting that additional processing costs were incurred compared to the
definite in this condition, in contrast to condition A. Second, competitor choices for indefinites were
significantly slower in this picture condition than they were in condition A (β = 547.9, SE = 80.6,
5 = 6.80). This suggests that the competing picture had a part in the decision process.
determiner
the
A
one
ONE

D IFF C OLOR
5%
23%
44.2%
44.5%

S INGLE I TEM
95%
77%
57.4%
55.5%

RT
3443
3809
3902
3868

Table 4: Picture choices by determiner condition B.
Our predictions for condition C were completely borne out. D IFF C OLOR picture was chosen
for the definite due to facilitated domain restriction, and for the indefinite since it verified both
its anti-uniqueness inference and implicature. There were significantly more target choices for the
indefinite in condition C than there were in B and A (B: β = 5.60, SE = 0.32, z = 17.36, p < .001;
A: β = 8.66, SE = 0.42, z = 20.60, p < .001). Target choices were equally quick for all determiners.
determiner
the
A
one
ONE

D IFF C OLOR
86%
99.3%
100%
98%

S AME C OLOR
14%
0.7%
0%
2%

RT
3593
3347
3233
3228

Table 5: Picture choices by determiner condition C.
Next, we will report the data from eye-movements we collected. For graphing the results,
we created windows of 50 ms and plotted the percentage of looks (fixations) to critical regions
(target, competitor, distractor). The figures below report Target Advantage scores, i.e., looks to target
minus the looks to competitor. For statistical analysis, we computed linear mixed effect models for
log-transformed scores in R, using |t| >2 as an indication of significance. Critical regions for the
computation of inferences started with the onset of the noun, and the onset of the PP, and the onset
4 Response

patterns where analyzed using logistic mixed effect models with the glmer function in R.
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of the AP, as indicated by the vertical lines in (13). The PP itself is never informative and thus we
expect the calculation of inferences to start upon hearing the noun itself.
(13) A | shirt | in Benjamin’s closet is | blue.
The first time window we looked at was thus 500-700 ms after onset of the noun, which is right
before the PP onset, indicated as the first vertical black line in the graph below. Neither PICTURE
CONDITION nor DETERMINER have an impact on target advantage in this time window.
A

B

C

TargAdv %

0.3

determiner
A
One

0.0

ONEN
The
-0.3

0

500 1000 1500 2000

0

500 1000 1500 2000

0

500 1000 1500 2000

Noun Onset Time

Figure 10: Target advantage all determiners by condition.
Interesting patterns start to show up in the second time window we looked at, 700-900 ms after
noun onset and thus right after the PP onset. There was a significant effect of PICTURE CONDITION
for “a” versus “the”: for the definite there is a difference only between conditions A and C (β =
3.76, SE = 0.95, t = 3.95), for the indefinite between conditions A and B (β = 2.31, SE = 0.94,
t = 2.44) as well as A and C (β = 2.58, SE = 0.94, t = 2.75), with significantly more looks to the
target in conditions B and C than in A, see Figure 11. This is surely due to the fact that what was
originally labelled target in condition A did not play a role in the decision at all. Looks are going
to the competitor for the indefinite in condition A early on, compare the upper left graph in Figure
10. In addition, response becomes significant as a predictor of TargetAdvantage for indefinite “a”
(β = −3.47, SE = 1.73, t = −2.01) but not for “the”, i.e. ultimate target choice influenced the looks
to the target for the indefinite early on. Moreover, there is a marginal effect of DETERMINER (“the”
versus “a”) in condition B, if choice was the target (β = −3.31, SE = 1.79, t = 1.85): there are more
looks to the target for the definite than there are for the indefinite at this point.
The third time window we looked at was 900-1100ms after noun onset, which is right after the
PP onset. We see highly significant effects of PICTURE CONDITION for both definite and indefinite
DETERMINER (“A”-A vs. B: β = 3.53, SE = .97, t = 3.62; “A”-A vs. C: β = 5.17, SE = .97,
t = 5.32; “The”-A vs. B: β = 3.75, SE = .98, t = 3.85; “The”-A vs. C: β = 4.41, SE = .97,
t = 4.53). Most importantly, there is a marginally significant interaction between time window two
and three and DETERMINER (“a” versus “the”) in condition B if the choice was the target (β = 4.17,
SE = 2.13, t = 1.96). There is a higher target advantage for the indefinite than for the definite in the
first time window, whereas in the second time window the target advantage for the definite is higher,
see the effect highlighted by the two blue boxes (indicating time windows) in Figure 12 below.
3.6 Discussion
The results confirm the weak epistemic status of MP! based inferences. In condition B, where the
implicature of the indefinite did not play a role, choices were only rarely influenced by the antiuniqueness inference of the indefinite. In line with what is predicted the reaction time data suggest,
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Figure 11: Target advantage all conditions by determiner.

Figure 12: Target advantage condition B if choice = target.
however, that, if computed, MP! based inferences require more time than presuppositions. In addition, the eye-tracking data suggest that the time course of the computation of these inferences is
different from the one of presuppositions. The competitor picture seems to play a role in computing
MP! based inference, as shown by relatively late looks to the competitor for the indefinite compared
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to the definite when target is ultimately chosen. This speaks in favour of an approach to MP! that
works with alternatives. Yet it seems that comparing the indefinite to its presuppositional alternative
is not as automatic as lexical competition triggered for implicatures, i.e. most of the time the target
sentences seemed to be interpreted as lacking an anti-uniqueness inference.
This could mean that indefinites are about novelty not antiuniqueness after all (Heim 1983), and
that the observed oddness effects are due to “anti-familiarity” inferences. However, it may also be
that the indefinite is simply ambiguous between an existential and a modifier with a presupposition of
existence in subject position (see Heim 2012 for discussion). And possibly only one of them enters
competition with the definite. Some evidence for this view comes from the differences between
indefinites and numerals we observed. Anti-uniqueness inferences were computed to a higher degree
for numerals than for indefinites and they displayed a different eye movement pattern. This might
be due to the fact that a simple existential interpretation is less likely for numerals, which suggest
that the number of items is at-issue, however existence is not. Not much is known about the factors
that influence when the interpretation of the indefinite depends on the competition with the definite.
The standard examples discussed for MP! suggest that stereo-typicality of the uniqueness plays a
role. Recently, it has been suggested that strength of the inference might depend on whether the
speaker is an Authority (Rouillard and Schwarz 2017). The knowledge state of the speaker is not
made sufficiently clear in our experiments. Further research is needed to understand what factors
trigger MP! based competition. Our results suggest that theories distinguishing these inferences
from implicatures and presuppositions are on the right track. The reliability of the inference as
well as the time course of its computation differ from the one we observe for presuppositions and
implicatures alike. To get a better understanding of these inferences, more reliable factors for their
derivation need to be established.
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